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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Tax Problems Relating to
Separation and Divorce'
G. Charles Scharfy
IT IS PROBABLY not stretching the -truth unduly to state that insofar
as the average legal practitioner is concerned, the tax problems relating
to separation and divorce are limited to a rather narrow field - the
deductibility of alimony or support payments by the husband and the
taxability of such payments to the wife. It might, therefore, not be
amiss to at least alert those who are not already aware of the problems,
to the existence of a number of related tax ramifications which may also
be present - in some degree - in family separation matters. For
example, in the income
tax field, questions arise
THE AutroR (Ph.B., 1938, LLB., 1940, Uni- concerning the tax basis to
versity of Toledo), is a partner in the law firm th
of Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick in Toledo, Ohio. e wife of property trans-
ferred to her by the hus-
band pursuant to a di-
vorce or separation arrangement. Other questions concern the realization
of income by the husband upon the transfer of property to the wife,
where the value of the property has appreciated over his tax basis. Addi-
tionally, the gift tax field is involved in questions concerning the pos-
sible application of the gift tax to transfers between the spouses; and the
estate tax field is involved in questions concerning the deductibility for
estate tax purposes of alimony and child support obligations remaining
unfulfilled at the death of the husband.
In the income tax field, the 1954 Internal Revenue Code made a
number of significant changes to the alimony rules, and the purpose of
this paper will be to summarize the basic alimony and support rules, to
discuss -the more important changes effected by the new Code, and then
to discuss the more "offbeat" or lesser-known income, gift and estate
tax ramifications attendant upon separation and divorce situations.
I. INCOME TAx
It is a basic tenet of the statutory scheme involving alimony that a
definite interrelationship exists between Section 71 of the Code (deal-
ing with taxability of alimony to the wife), Section 215 (dealing with
1. This article is based upon material presented by the author at the Cleveland
Regional Tax Institute in September, 1958.
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deductability of alimony payments by the husband) and Section 682
(dealing with trust income payable to the wife in cases involving separa-
tion or divorce). For example, Section 215, the deduction section, states
in very simple and concise fashion that the husband shall be allowed as a
deduction "amounts includible under Section 71 in the gross income of
his wife." Section 71 is considerably more detailed in setting forth rules
relating to the includability of alimony payments in the gross income of
the wife. And each section makes cross reference to the other and to
Section 682.
It may be stated as a general rule, therefore, that in order for an
alimony payment to be deductible by the husband, it must be includible
in the wife's income. However, it appears that rare exceptions to this
general rule may exist, and at least one such exception has already been
recognized. Thus, a Revenue Ruling2 holds that a citizen and resident
of Puerto Rico, earning income subject to the U.S. income tax, may de-
duct alimony payments made to his former wife, even though such pay-
ments are exempt from tax in the hands of the wife by reason of Section
9333 of the Code. The ruling recognizes that Sections 71 and 215 are
"intended to be reciprocal and to be correlated where possible" but states
that to deny the deduction would not give proper effect to the exclusion
provisions of Section 933, and would "not accomplish the end sought by
Congress in passing this legislation because the husband would still have
to pay alimony and income tax thereon without the offset contemplated
by Congress."
The foregoing ruling follows the rationale of an earlier ruling4 in a
different field, which -held that deductions for distributions of income by
estates and trusts will not be disallowed merely because the distributees
(residents of Canada) did not have to pay income tax thereon by reason
of treaty exemptions.
While these exceptions are decidedly narrow in scope, they indicate
that under appropriate, albeit rare, circumstances the bonds intertwining
Sections 71 and 215 may be severed.
It is clear that Congress intended, by the enactment of Section 71
of the 1954 Code, to afford the husband greater relief with respect to
deductibility of alimony payments than had been available under the
analogous section of the 1939 Code.5 Under the old law only periodic
2. Rev. Rul. 585, 1956-2 Cum BULL. 166.
3. This section exempts from the U.S. income tax "In the case of an individual who
is a bona fide resident of Puerto Rico during the entire taxable year, income derived
from sources within Puerto Rico (except amounts received from service performed
as an employee of the United States or any agency thereof.....
4. I.T. 4019, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 58.
5. § 22 (k).
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payments made to a wife who was divorced or legally separated were
taxable to her and deductible by the husband. The 1954 Code provides
three categories of deductible alimony payments: (a) those made pur-
suant to a court decree of divorce or legal separation, or under a written
instrument incident to a divorce or legal separation, (b) those made
pursuant to a written separation agreement, where the parties are actually
separated, and (c) -those made pursuant to a decree for support or main-
tenance, where the parties are actually separated. Categories (b) and
(c) above are new, and eliminate the old requirement of a decree of
divorce or legal separation.
PEIODIC VS. INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS
As under the old law, the 1954 Code retains the requirement that only
"periodic payments" qualify as deductible alimony. While the Code does
not define the term "periodic payments," it does specifiy that installment
payments of a principal sum are not "periodic payments" unless they
extend for a period ending more than ten years from the date of the
decree, instrument or agreement. Whether or not certain payments are
"periodic payments," and hence deductible, or installment payments of a
principal sum, and hence not deductible, has long been a source of con-
fusion and conflict among the courts. In general the courts are in agree-
ment that a "principal sum" is involved if, by mathematical computation,
an aggregate total or sum can be determined. Thus, a requirement that
the husband pay $X per month for Y months - or $X per month until
Y total has been paid - would uniformly be considered as a "principal
sum" type of requirement. But there has been wide disagreement as to
whether payments which would not extend over more than a ten year
period would qualify as "periodic" because they were subject to being
discontinued upon the happening of future contingencies such as the
wife's remarriage, the husband's death, etc. Under the 1939 Code the
Tax Court had consistently held that "contingencies" would not convert
"installment" payments into "periodic" payments.6
The Courts of Appeals, on the other hand, have generally held to the
contrary.7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit resurrected a dis-
tinction which had been earlier rejected by the Tax Court as being
artificial and held8 that payments of a principal sum of $25,000 payable
6. See, e.g., J. B. Steinel, 10 T.C. 409 (1948); Estate of Frank P. Orsatti, 12 T.C.
188 (1949); Frank R. Casey, 12 T.C. 224 (1949); Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C.
1308 (1950).
7. Baker v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Birdwell v. Commis-
sioner, 235 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1956); Prewett v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 250 (8th
Cir. 1955); Myers v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1954).
8. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
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in 10 semi-annual installments (but subject to discontinuance upon the
wife's remarriage, or death of either spouse) were not periodic, while
monthly installments of $300 per month for a 5 year period (but sub-
ject to discontinuance upon the happening of the same contingencies)
were periodic - the distinction being bottomed upon the mentioning
of the principal sum in the first instance.
The Commissioner's regulations? under the 1954 Code indicate that
he has largely bowed to the reasoning of the Courts of Appeals, and
under such regulations payments over a period of 10 years or less will
be considered as "periodic" if subject to contingencies such as death of
either spouse, remarriage of wife or change in economic status of either
spouse, and it will not matter (1) whether the contingencies are spelled
out in the decree, instrument or agreement or result from local law, or
(2) whether the aggregate amount of the payments to be made in the
absence of the occurrence of the contingencies is spelled out or may
be mathematically or actuarially computed.
INTERLOCUTORY DECREES
Interlocutory decrees have likewise been a source of considerable liti-
gation under the 1939 Code. The Commissioner had taken the position
that such decrees had affected a legal separation under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance, that the parties could not file a joint income
tax return, and that the wife was taxable on the periodic payments made
during the period of the interlocutory decree.10
This position was adhered to by the Commissioner despite its rejection
by the Tax Court'1 and two Courts of Appeals.'
2
It seems probable that this particular area of dispute may have been
eliminated - or at least substantially restricted - by the enactment of
the 1954 Code, since payments during periods of interlocutory decrees
will generally qualify under the new sections which broaden alimony
payments to include those made under "support' decrees or "written
separation agreements," despite the absence of a decree of divorce or
legal separation.
INSURANCE ARRANGEmENTS
The tax effects of insurance provisions which are adopted or in-
corporated into divorce or separation arrangements have been a source
9. Reg. § 1.71-1(d) (3) (i) and (ii).
10. Rev. Rul. 178, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 322.
11. Martinet S. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049 (1953); Alice Humphreys Evans, 19 T.C.
1102 (1953).
12. Fourth Circuit in Commissioner v. Eccles, 208 F.2d 796 (1954), affirming
the Tax Court decision at note 11, supra; and Tenth Circuit in Commissioner v.
Evans, 211 F.2d 378 (1954), affirming the Tax Court decision at note 11, supra.
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of some uncertainty in the past. By reason of the considerable number
of decisions and rulings which have been handed down to date, however,
certain general conclusions may now be drawn:
(1) Whether or not the husband may deduct, as alimony,
premiums which he pays on insurance policies, depends upon the
degree of the wife's interest in the policies.
(a) If she is given all or substantially all rights of the owner
of the policies, the payments of the premiums are considered
equivalent to payments directly to her and would qualify as ali-
mony if they meet the general alimony rules (periodic, etc.).
The Commissioner has so ruled,13 and the courts have so held.14
(b) If, on the other hand, she is simply made the beneficiary
of the policy (even though irrevocably), it is generally considered
that she has not realized benefits sufficiently tangible during the
current year to warrant taxing her upon the premiums (or allow-
ing the husband to deduct same).15
(c) Similarly, if the insurance is merely security for the per-
formance of the husband's alimony payment obligations, the
premiums thereon will not be treated as alimony taxable to her
or deductible by him.1
(2) Where premiums are includible in the wife's income, they
are deductible by the husband. However, in Seligmann,'7 the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the allowance of a de-
duction to the husband, in a separate proceeding, was not res judicata
of the question of the includability of the premiums in the wife's in-
come, and under the facts of the case the wife was held not taxable
on such premiums. The court said:
. . . Moreover, while the rights of the husband to a deduction
under § 23 (u) are by express language made dependent upon the obli-
gation imposed upon the wife under § 22 (k), we do not think it neces-
sarily follows that the converse of that proposition is true. At any rate,
there is nothing in the language of § 22 (k) which makes the obligation
of the wife dependent upon the right of the husband under § 23 (u).
13. I.T. 4001, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 27.
14. Anita Quinby Stewart, 9 T.C. 195 (1947); Lemuel Alexander Carmichael, 14
T.C. 1356 (1950); cf. Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953).
15. Rev. Rul. 125, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 27; Seligmann, note 14, supra; Meyer
Blumenthal, 13 T.C. 28 (1949); aff'd 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950); Lillian
Bond Smith, 21 T.C. 353 (1953); Beulah Weil, 22 T.C. 612 (1954); Carl G. Ort-
mayer, 28 T.C. 64 (1957).
16. William J. Gardner, 14 T.C. 1445 (1950), aff'd 191 F.2d 857 (6th Cir.
1951); Halsey W. Taylor, 16 T.C. 376 (1951); F. Ellsworth Baker, 17 T.C. 1610(1952); aff'd 205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953); Lillian Bond Smith, note 15, supra.
17. Seligmann v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953).
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So far as the obligation of the wife is concerned, we think we must treat
5 22(k) as if it stood alone, independent of § 23(u)....
(3) Insofar as the proceeds of insurance or annuity policies
are concerned, such proceeds would be taxable to the wife if they
met the general alimony requirements (i.e., if they are periodic, and
in discharge of the husband's alimony obligations). The general
exclusion of life insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death
of the insured, provided -by Section 101(a) of the Code, does not
apply to amounts which qualify as alimony, by reason of the specific
application of Section 101(e); and the general annuity rules are
specifically excepted in the case of payments which qualify as ali-
mony. 1
9
SUPPORT OF MINOR CHILDREN
Payments by the husband for the support of minor children are not
deductible as alimony, nor are they includible in the wife's income. As
a practical matter, however, the wording of different divorce decrees or
written agreements frequently makes it difficult to determine whether
particular payments are alimony payments or child-support payments. Of
course where specific amounts are designated as being for child support,
no problem is presented. But where the decree or instrument requires
a modification to so-called "alimony" payments in the event of the wife's
remarriage, or the death or attainment of majority of one or more children,
it may be that what superficially purports to be alimony, is in fact child-
support money. The Tax Court has rather consistently followed the ap-
proach that if, reading the decree or instrument as a whole, a portion of
the payments can reasonably be said to have been intended for child-
support purposes, an allocation should be made ° The Courts of Appeals,
however, have adopted differing approaches to the problem which do not
seem capable of reconciliation.
The Second Circuit has taken the position that in order for payments
to be considered payable for the support of a child, they must be spe-
cifically restricted to that purpose.21 On the other hand, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, although stating that it agreed with the Weil decision of the Second
18. This conclusion was adhered to by the same appellate court in Lehman v.
United States, 239 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1956), and has been recognized by the Tax
Court, Estate of Marguerite D. Haldeman, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 718 (1956).
19. § 72 (k).
20. Warren Leslie, Jr. 10 T.C. 807 (1948); Harold M. Fleming, 14 T.C. 1308
(1950); Truman W. Morsman, 27 T.C. 520 (1957); Russell W. Boettiger, 31
T.C. No. 49 (November 28, 1958).
21. Weil v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1957); Estate of Dorothy R.
Hirshon, 250 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1957).
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Circuit as applied to its facts, disagreed with the generality of its language
and held it to be inapplicable to the facts of the case before it,22 stating:
The general rule which we here approve is that when the settlement
agreement, read as a whole, discloses that the parties have earmarked or
designated or apportioned or allocated the payments to be made, one part
to be payable for alimony, and another part to be payable for the sup-
port of children, with sufficient certainty and specificity to readily de-
termine which is which, without reference to contingencies which may
never come into being, then the "part of any periodic payment" has been
fixed "by the terms of the decree or written instrument" and satisfies
the statutes and regulations hereinbefore quoted....I
In our own Sixth Circuit, the Appellate Court has had occasion to
consider this problem in two instances. In its earlier decision in Budd v.
Commissioner,24 the court approved the Tax Court decision2 5 which
made an allocation based upon the following facts: H to pay W $500
per month for support of W and one child; if W remarries, monthly
sum is reduced to $200; if child goes to private preparatory school, H
pays for school expenses plus $200 per month while the child is on vaca-
tion. Upon majority of child (or death prior to majority), H pays $300
per month to W so long as she remains unmarried. The Tax Court and
the Appellate Court allocated $200 per month to child support, and dis-
allowed this portion as an alimony deduction by the husband.
In its most recent decision,28 however, the Sixth Circuit has apparently
considerably restricted its Budd holding (without explicitly saying so)
and seems to be following the rationale of the Second Circuit to the effect
that there must be a clear-cut earmarking of child support funds before
the court will disallow any part of the payment as an alimony deduction
to the husband. The court construed the statutory word "fix"2 7 to mean
"assign precisely" or "make definite and settled" in accordance with its
usual meaning. As the situation stands today in the Sixth Circuit, it seems
clear that unless the decree, instrument or agreement clearly allocates
portions to the children, and unless there is some restriction upon the
use of such allocated portions by the wife, the entire amounts will be
taxed to her as alimony, even though they are subject to reduction upon
the happening of future contingencies (such as the children's death, etc.),
22. Jo Eisinger v. Commissioner, 250 Fed. 303 (1957), cert. den. 356 U.S. 913
(1958).
23. Id. at 308.
24. 177 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1947).
25. Robert W. Budd, 7 T.C. 413 (1946).
26. Deitsch v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957).
27. § 71 (b) excludes from the definition of alimony such part of any payments
as the terms of the decree, instrument or agreement "fix" as a sum which is payable
for child support.
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and even though, by reason of such potential reduction it could be "in-
ferred" that the amount of such reduction was intended to reflect an
amount for the support of the children. The court will no longer make
surmises or inferences on this point -but will require a clear-cut ear-
marking.
DLUCIBILIT y OF LEGAL ExPENSES
The deductibility of legal expenses incurred in connection with di-
vorce and separation is a matter of great interest and importance to the
parties involved, since frequently such expenses are substantial
especially if property settlement arrangements are contested.
Section 262 prohibits a deduction for "personal, living, or family
expenses," and it has been held that legal expenses in procuring a divorce,
custody of children and other matters of a similarly personal nature fall
within this prohibition. 8 To be deductible at all, such expenses must
come within the purview of Section 212, which allows a deduction for
expenses incurred for the production or collection of income, and for
the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the
production of income. Despite the earlier, restrictive view of the Com-
missioner and the Tax Court on the matter, it is now well settled that
attorney fees paid by the wife in obtaining taxable alimony are deductible
by her.29 Court costs and other expenses incurred for the same purposes
are given the same treatment.8 0 Where fees and expenses are attributable
to the securing of taxable alimony and other services, an allocation must
be made and only the portion attributable to the alimony is deductible8 t
The area of deductibility of similar expenses incurred by the husband
is considerably narrower, and still the subject of dispute between the
courts. Although expenses of the wife in obtaining taxable alimony
are deductible, expenses of the husband in resisting having to pay such
alimony are generally not deductible.32 Nor are attorney fees of the wife,
paid by the husband, deductible by him.3 However, a slight chink has
developed in this wall of non-deductibility, and the husband has, in cer-
tain limited cases, been allowed to deduct legal expenses which arose in
28. Frank J. Loverin, 10 T.C. 406 (1948); Robert A. McKinney, 16 T.C. 916
(1951).
29. Elsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949) acq., 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 2; Barbara B.
LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949), acq., 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 3; T.D. 5889, 1952-1 CuM.
BULL. 31.
30. Agnes Pyne Coke, 17 T.C. 403 (1951).
31. LeMond, note 29, supra.
32. Thorne Donnelley, 16 T.C. 1196 (1951); Lindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157
(1951).
33. Loverin and McKinney, note 28, supra.
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the course of divorce or separation proceedings. Thus, in Baer v. Com-
missioner,34 in the first of the new and limited line of cases, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (one judge dissenting) allowed the
deduction of attorney fees paid to protect the husband's most important
income-producing asset from his wife's claims. The syllabus of that
case provides in part as follows:
Where there was little occasion for services of counsel in divorce
proceedings proper and services of taxpayer's counsel were largely de-
voted to adjusting his liability to his wife so as to prevent break-up of
taxpayer's stockholdings and thereby reducing his income by depriving
him of control of corporation, attorney's fees did not constitute 'personal
family expenses" but rather expenses incurred for "conservation of prop-
erty" held for production of income, and therefore taxpayer was entitled
to deduct from his gross income sum paid to his attorneys, notwithstand-
ing fact that same attorneys also acted for taxpayer in connection with
his domestic controversy ... '
Approving the rationale of the foregoing decision, the Court of
Claims subsequently held:8 6
...Generally, fees paid by a husband in resisting his wife's mone-
tary demands incident to a divorce are not deductible under Section
23(a) (2). . . . When the controversy between the spouses goes
not to the question of liability but to the manner in which it might be
met and, at the same time the wife demands a part of the husband's
income-producing property, control over which affects the husband's
general income-earning capacity, legal fees incurred by the husband are
deductible.
Despite its reversal by the Eighth Circuit in the Baer case, the Tax
Court decided in F. C. Bowers, 7 to adhere to its position denying a de-
duction to the husband under an analogous set of facts. In the Bowers
case a husband's principal source of income was compensation and divi-
dends from a closely held corporation. In a divorce action his wife asked
for a division of property, and claimed a right to a portion of his shares
in the company. The husband incurred substantial legal fees in resisting
her claims to his stock. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
however, reversed the Tax Court's denial of a deduction for the legal
expenses,38 holding:
Where taxpayer's wife instituted divorce proceedings which were un-
contested and services of taxpayer's lawyers were largely devoted to
adjusting taxpayer's liability to wife so as to prevent breakup of his
stock holdings and thereby reduce his income by depriving him of cor-
34. 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952), reversing 16 T.C. 1418 (1951).
35. Id. at 646-47.
36. George McMurtry v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 114, 116 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
37. 25 T.C. 452 (1955).
38. Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957).
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porate control, attorneys fees were, under 139 Internal Revenue Code,
incurred for conservation of property held for production of income and
were deductible, notwithstanding fact that same attorneys also acted for
him in connection with his domestic controversy...
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has sided with the Tax
Court, and has disapproved of the Baer decision. 9
A District Court in California has distinguished the Baer decision
and held that where a wife in a divorce proceeding claimed that all of
the husband's property was community property, while he claimed it to
be separate property, his attorney fees were incurred in defending his
tide to the property, and hence were capital expenditures and non-
deductible.40
It is believed that the viewpoints of the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit are irreconcilable with the viewpoints of the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits and the Court of Claims. Little attempt is made by the courts to
distinguish the conflicting views, and it appears that the matter will
probably not be put to rest until either the Supreme Court or Congress
steps in.
BAsIs PROBLEMS OF WIFE
Property settlements give rise to questions concerning the wife's tax
basis in the property received by her pursuant to such settlements. In
the first of a series of cases considered by the Tax Court in recent years,4 '
under a separation agreement, a husband agreed to pay his wife $750,000
in consideration of her releasing her rights in his estate. Subsequently,
a method of paying the $750,000 was agreed upon, pursuant to which
various stocks, bonds, an automobile and cash were transferred to the
wife at agreed prices per unit. Among the assets so transferred were
6,000 shares of Western Auto stock, at a price of $60.00 per share. This
price was arrived at on the basis of its fluctuating market value over a
period of several months preceding the settlement. On the actual date of
transfer of the stock to her, the market value was $56.00 per share. The
issue was whether her basis was $60.00 or $56.00 per share. The Tax
Court held that the transaction was an arms-length one, that in agreeing
to accept 6,000 shares in satisfaction of $360,000 of her $750,000 claim
against her husband, she used up that much of her $750,000 credit. In
other words, the stock "cost" her $60.00 per share (or $360,000 in the
aggregate), since she consumed that much of her credit or claim to the
entire $750,000 in accepting it at that price.
39. Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958).
40. Harris v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
41. Aleda N. Hall, 9 T.C. 53 (1947).
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Subsequently, under somewhat analogous facts, the Tax Court arrived
at a similar result in Christina DeBourbon Patino,42 without, however,
citing the Hall decision.
In the Patino case, however, the Commissioner argued that the trans-
fer of shares to the wife was a gift, and that she therefore obtained the
donor's basis. The court, however, held that in accepting the shares she
surrendered valuable support and property rights, that the transaction
was an arms-length one, and that the $20.00 per share value placed
upon the stock by the parties became her tax basis. The Patino decision
was affirmed on appeal. 43
In Edna W. Gardner Trust,44 a transfer of stock into a trust created
for the benefit of the wife, pursuant to settlement of marital differences
and the wife's relinquishment of her dower, support and other marital
rights, was held not to be a gift (even though recited in the instrument
as being a "voluntary gift"), and the trust's basis was the agreed value
of the stock at the time of transfer to the trust.
An interesting and unusual decision in a slightly different context is
that of Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commisioner,45 in which the petitioner re-
ceived stock as part of a prenuatial settlement. The Commissioner
determined that she received it as a gift and that she took the donor's
basis. The donor was S. S. Kresge, and the stock was stock of S. S.
Kresge Co. The stock had a value when received by her in 1924 of over
$300 per share. The donor's basis was around $4.00 per share. The
Supreme Court, had, in two cases under the gift tax law, held that similar
transfers were taxable gifts. The Second Circuit held, however, that
although the gift tax and estate tax laws are to be construed in pari
materia, this did not apply to the income tax law. Since petitioner's
marital rights in his property (which she relinquished by the prenuptial
agreement) were far in excess of what she received (he was worth about
$375,000,000), she was a "purchaser" of the shares for a fair considera-
tion.46
CAPITAL GAINS PROBLEMS OF HUSBAND
The transfer of property to the wife pursuant to divorce or separation
agreements presents tax problems to the husband as well as the wife, and
42. 13 T.C. 816 (1949).
43. Commissioner v. Patino, 186 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1950).
44. 20 T.C. 885 (1953).
45. 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947), -reversing 6 T.C. 652 (1946).
46. The conclusion of the appellate court in the Farid-es-Sultaneh case has been
criticized by a district court in Pennsylvania as not answering "why" the word
"gift" should not be given the same meaning under all revenue statutes. Dunn v.
United States, 86 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
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the Tax Court and Circuit Courts have uniformly held the husband to
have realized a capital gain where the property is worth more, at the
time of transfer, than the husband's tax basis. Thus, the Third Circuit47
has held that where, as part of a divorce settlement, a husband transferred
stock costing him $7,500 to his wife, and the stock had a then value of
$157,000, he realized a capital gain on the difference. The court held
he exchanged the stock for a release of his support obligations, and that
the parties in an arm's length deal put a value upon such obligations.
The court said "We think that we may make the practical assumption
that a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an
unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth.' 48 (Two of five judges
dissented, and agreed with the Tax Court that it was impossible to value
the rights of the wife which were surrendered.)
The rationale of the Third Circuit was approved and followed by
the Second Circut.40 9 The Commissioner in a ruling 0 which deals with a
transfer of appreciated property into a trust created for life benefit of
wife pursuant to separation agreement, with remainder interest to charity
holds the husband taxable on the appreciation reduced by the present
value of the remainder interest.
Acceding to the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuit decisions,
the Tax Court in the recent Stouffer5 case has held that where a husband,
pursuant to a divorce settlement and decree, relinquished an option he
had possessed to purchase his wife's shares of stock, such relinquishment
caused him to realize capital gain upon the difference between the market
value of the stock at the time of relinquishment ($400,000) and the
option price ($40,000), less the $1.00 option consideration paid by the
husband - or a net gain of $359,999.
I. GiFt TAx
Transfers of money or property from husbands to wives, pursuant to
divorce and separation settlements, frequently raise gift tax as well as
income tax questions. As noted above, for income tax purposes, the
courts have generally held that since the wife surrendered or relinquished
valuable support and other marital rights in exchange for such money
or property, she in effect "purchased" or gave consideration for such
assets, and hence acquired a basis equal to either the fair market value at
the time of the property transfer to her, or to an agreed arms length
47. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941).
48. Id. at 988.
49. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942).
50. Rev. RuL 507, 1957-2 CUm. BULL. 511.
51. Estate of Gordon A. Stouffer, 30 T.C. No. 131 (Sept. 19, 1958).
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valuation placed upon the property as part of the settlement arrangement.
However, for gift tax purposes, the question has undergone a somewhat
confusing development. The earliest decisions and rulings arose as a
result of premarital or ante-nuptial agreements. In Merrill v. Fahs,52
the Supreme Court held that a transfer in trust for the benefit of an
intended wife, in exchange for her release of rights she would otherwise
acquire in the husband's property, was subject to the gift tax. The gift
tax statute taxes transfers made for "less than an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth." 3 The estate tax statutes provide
that "a relinquishment or promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or
of a statutory estate created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other
marital rights in the decedent's property or estate, shall not be considered
to any extent a consideration 'in money or money's worth."' 54 The Su-
preme Court held the gift tax to be supplementary to the estate tax.
"The two are in pari materia and must be construed together."
In the following year the Commissioner ruled55 that transfers made
pursuant to an agreement incident to divorce or legal separation were
subject to gift tax to the extent they were made in relinquishment of
dower, curtesy or other property rights, but to the extent they were made
in satisfaction of sapport rights they were not subject to gift tax.
In 1950, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the gift tax
liability attendant upon a transfer of property in a divorce proceeding,
where the property settlement agreement was incorporated in a court
decree. The court held that under such circumstances the transfer was
not merely pursuant to a promise or agreement, but pursuant to a court
decree, and hence not subject to gift tax.56 This was so despite a provi-
sion of the decree which stated that the provisions of the settlement
agreement would survive the decree. Naturally enough, after the above
decision, parties in similar circumstances were generally careful to have
private divorce or separation property settlement agreements incorporated
into the divorce or legal separation decrees! It is to be noted that trans-
fers to or for the benefit of adult children (or to minor children in
amounts in excess of their support needs) are subject to gift tax, whether
or not pursuant to court decree.57
52. 324 U.S. 308 (1945). The companion case of Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303 (1945), had the same general effect.
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 1002, [now § 2512(b)].
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 812(b), [now § 2043(b)].
55. E.T. 19, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 166.
56. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
57. Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953); Karl T. Wiede-
mann, 26 T.C. 565 (1956).
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Congress stepped into one segment of this field by the enactment of
Section 2516 of the 1954 Code. This section removes gift tax liability
for transfers made in settlement of marital or property rights, or to pro-
vide a reasonable support allowance for minor children, if (1) the ar-
rangement is pursuant to a written agreement between the spouses, and
(2) divorce occurs within two years thereafter. The statute explicitly
removes any necessity of approval or incorporation of the arrangement
by a court decree. In his proposed Regulations,58 the Commissioner has
indicated that even in cases not covered by the new Code section (e.g.,
where divorce does not occur within two years, etc.) a transfer in settle-
ment of dower, curtesy or other property rights may nevertheless be gift-
tax-exempt if "effected" by court decree. The Commissioner thus appears
to be following the distinction laid down by the Supreme Court in the
Harris case.69
III. ESTATE TAX
With respect to the estate tax field, questions have arisen concerning
the deductibility of alimony and support claims by the wife or children
against the deceased husband's estate. The 1954 Code 0 allows a deduc-
tion for "claims against the estate," but limits such deduction,61 in the
case of claims founded on a promise or agreement to the extent they
were contracted "bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth." The Code62 in turn provides that a re-
linquishment of dower, curtesy or other marital rights in the decedent's
estate shall not be considered to any extent a consideration in money or
money's worth. As a result (and in line with the rationale of the dis-
tinction laid down for gift tax purposes by the Supreme Court in the
Harris case) alimony claims of the wife may only be deducted if based
upon court decree, and not a mere promise or private agreement.65 The
footnoted cases indicate the general judicial attitude that the claim is
founded on the decree, and not a mere promise or agreement, where the
decree incorporates or approves the private agreement, even in cases where
58. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1.
59. 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
60. § 2053 (a).
61. § 2053(c).
62. § 2043(b).
63. Commissioner v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942); Com-
missioner v. Estate of Angus 0. Swink, 155 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1946); Commis-
sioner v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Estate of Myles C.
Watson, 216 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1954).
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the agreement or decree specifically notes that the agreement survives or
exists independently of the decree. However, the Tax Court has attempted
to limit the allowance of the deduction, and in a fairly recent case held
that where, in the absence of fraud or compulsion, the court must, under
local law, approve or follow a private property settlement agreement, the
claim is based upon the agreement and not the decree.64 It is perhaps
significant that under the Commissioner's proposed Estate Tax Regula-
tions" a transfer in trust pursuant to a court decree was not to be con-
sidered taxable, insofar as the wife's interest therein was concerned
(where such interest was created in consideration of her relinquishment
of marital property rights) while the final Regulations omit this pro-
vision.
The Tax Court has held66 that where a decedent had created a trust
for the support of his wife and minor children, pursuant to a separation
agreement, and the parties were not divorced, the value of the trust
property was includible in his estate as a transfer in which he had -re-
tained a life estate. The theory of the holding was that he had an obliga-
tion to support his wife during his lifetime, that the trust discharged this
obligation, and that as a result he in practical effect retained the right to
and enjoyment of the trust income during his lifetime. Further, a deduc-
tion was denied for so much of the trust value as was attributable to the
discharge of his obligation to support his wife, since Section 812 (b) of
the 1939 Code67 provided that relinquishment of marital rights was not
a consideration in money or money's worth - and as noted earlier, claims
based upon promises or agreements are not deductible unless incurred for
full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth. (The claim
in this case was founded upon a mere promise, there being no court
decree involved.) However, to the extent the transfer was in considera-
tion of the release of the decedents obligation to support his children,
it was for adequate consideration, and an exclusion was allowed for the
commuted value of the children's support. A similar exclusion for that
portion of a trust considered attributable to the discharge of a decedents
obligation to support minor children was likewise allowed in D. G. Mc-
Donald Trust.68
The selection of cited decisions in the foregoing discussion was not
intended to be exhaustive, since numerous cases support certain of the
64. Estate of Chester H. Bowers, 23 T.C. 911 (1955).
65. Proposed Treas. Reg. 5 20.2043-1 (b).
66. Estate of Robert Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956).
67. INr. Rnv. CODE oF 1954, § 2043 (b).
68. 19 T.C. 672 (1953); afl'd sub -nom Chase National Bank v. Commissioner,
225 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1955).
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stated conclusions, and reference to each such case would serve no useful
purpose. The cases cited were selected as being either of a "pioneering"
nature, as -representative of the holding of a number of similar cases, or
as containing a good general discussion of the issues and a helpful refer-
ence to prior analogous and supporting decisions. The breadth of the
scope of this article has precluded all but the most basic attempt to ap-
praise or evaluate the correctness or legal justification of any one de-
cision. It is hoped that sufficient guideposts have been furnished in
the lesser-known tax aspects of divorce and separation to permit anyone
interested in a particular phase of the subject matter to pursue same in
more detail and with greater refinement or distillation of the applicable
legal principles.
